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The ALICE Detector Data Link (DDL) is a high-speed 
optical link designed to interface the readout electronics of 
ALICE sub-detectors to the DAQ computers. The Source 
Interface Unit (SIU) of the DDL will operate in radiation 
environment. Previous tests showed that a configuration loss 
of SRAM-based FPGA devices may happen and the 
frequency of undetected data errors in the FPGA user 
memory area is also not acceptable. Therefore, we re-
designed the SIU card using another FPGA based on flash 
technology. In order to detect bit errors in the user memory 
we added parity check logic to the design. The new SIU has 
been extensively tested using neutron and proton irradiation 
to verify its radiation tolerance. In this paper we summarize 
the design changes, introduce the final design, and the results 
of the radiation tolerance measurements on the final card. 
I. THE ALICE DETECTOR DATA LINK (DDL)  
AND RADIATION 
The ALICE Detector Data Link (DDL) is a high-speed, 
duplex, point-to-point optical link designed to interface the 
readout electronics of all the ALICE sub-detectors to the 
DAQ computers in a standard way [1]. The DDL consists of 
the Source Interface Unit (SIU), an optical cable of up to 300 
meters, and the Destination Interface Unit (DIU). The DIUs 
are integrated onto the Read-out Receiver Cards of the DAQ 
(D-RORC). The DDL provides enough bandwidth to transfer 
data from the detectors to the DAQ at 200 MB/s per link [2]. 
The SIU will be attached to the Front-end Electronics; hence, 
it will be exposed to the radiation caused by the interacting 
particles. According to the latest simulations, the highest 
radiation level for the SIU card is expected at the inner radius 
of the TPC detector [3], where the total ionising dose is 1.6 
krad, the neutron fluence is 3.9 × 1011 neutrons/cm2, and the 
proton fluence is 8 × 109 for 10 years of operation [4]. The 
1MeV neutron equivalent total hadron fluence is 1.5 × 1011 
neutrons/cm2. (The SIU card is not placed directly into the 
inner tracking system, where the radiation is even higher. 
From those sub-detectors data is transferred through custom 
radiation hard links before it is being multiplexed and sent 
over the DDL.)  
The SIU hardware consists of three main components. 
The DDL protocol and additional logic functions are 
implemented in a programmable logic device (FPGA). The 
prototype SIU card has been built around an SRAM-based 
Altera APEX-E FPGA. The electrical transceiver performs 
serial-to-parallel and parallel-to-serial data conversion. The 
full-duplex optical transceiver makes the conversion between 
the high-speed differential electrical data and the optical 
signal. Auxiliary components are voltage regulators and a 
crystal oscillator.  
The first radiation tolerant measurements of the prototype 
SIU components and the prototype SIU card are described in 
details in [5]. According to these measurements several 
electrical and optical transceivers, crystal oscillators, and 
voltage regulators have successfully passed the tests. We had 
not observed any functional errors at these components and 
the single-bit transmission errors of the optical transceivers 
also proved to be much below the permitted error rate.  
According to these first measurements we found that from 
point of view of radiation tolerance, the most vulnerable 
component of the whole SIU card would be the FPGA 
device. We identified two issues that had to be investigated in 
details, namely the device configuration loss and the data 
corruption due to SEUs in the embedded user memory and 
the registers. In this paper, we shortly summarize these two 
problems and their solutions. We describe the final design, 
and show the new radiation tolerance test results. 
II. CONFIGURATION LOSS AND ITS SOLUTION 
Tests have shown that though the FPGA tolerates the 
required level of total ionisation dose (TID), single event 
upsets (SEUs) caused by neutron or proton irradiation have a 
frequency higher than acceptable. These SEUs may produce 
data errors during operation, or if they happen in the device 
configuration SRAM cells, they may provoke corruption (or 
even loss) of the device configuration. The later is very 
critical, because it causes an immediate functional interrupt 
on the given device.  
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According to the tests, we have calculated the MTBF 
value and found that we would face 1 loss of configuration 
every hour in the DAQ system containing 400 DDL SIU 
cards. We also tested FPGAs of about the same size and 
complexity from Xilinx, but found very similar results as they 
are also based on SRAM configuration cell technology. See 
Table 1 for the measurement results.  
Table 1: Measurement results on configuration loss  
in Altera APEX-E and Xilinx VIRTEX II SRAM-based FPGAs 
SEU cross sections /configuration cell 
σconfig cell   of 5-14 MeV neutrons 
(0.17 - 0.71) ·10-13 
cm2 /logic cell 
σconfig cell   of 48-50 MeV protons 
(5.5 - 10.7) ·10-13 
cm2 /logic cell 
σconfig cell   of 94-100 MeV protons 
(5.5 - 10.2) ·10-13 
cm2 /logic cell 
σconfig cell   of 171-180 MeV protons 
(4.5 – 9.0) ·10-13 
cm2 /logic cell 
60Co γ irradiation  (dose rate: 40 Gy/hour) no damage  up to 100 Gy 
Calculated number of configuration errors 
# of config. loss in 10 years in 1 SIU card 20 – 50 (neutrons) 9 – 20 (protons) 
# of config. loss per hour in 400 SIUs ~ 1 not acceptable 
 
Since it was not acceptable for the DAQ system, a new, 
radiation tolerant DDL SIU had to be designed. We 
considered three possible ways to solve the problem. 
The first option was to continue using Altera or Xilinx 
SRAM-based FPGAs and work out special mitigation 
techniques to recover from configuration losses. However, 
none of the discussed solutions seemed to be simple, all 
require additional logic circuits on the board (that are also 
target of radiation tolerance problems), and even with these 
costly (in terms of design and test work) additions we can not 
entirely eliminate the problem. 
The second option was to use a custom, radiation hard 
ASIC. Although, this option is technically the most reliable, 
because the number of links in ALICE is small, we could not 
afford this solution (high NRE cost). Finally, the last option 
was the use of another kind of FPGAs that is based on a 
different silicon technology. In those FPGAs where the 
configuration is stored in flash memory cells, the 
configuration is intrinsically much more protected against 
irradiation. A detailed discussion of the options we 
considered can be found in the first part of [6].  
Finally, we chose the flash-memory based ProASIC 
device family of Actel. These programmable logic devices 
combine the power of the FPGAs and the resistance against 
configuration loss seen in other type of FPGAs.  
The block diagram of the re-designed SIU card is shown 
















































* PCB design is compatible for APA150 (ProASIC+) and A3P250 (ProASIC3) devices.  
In the final version the A3P250 device is used because of its performance advantages.  
Figure 1: Block diagram of the final SIU card 
The physical level of the data transmission is the same as 
before, the logic part has been re-built around an Actel 
ProsASIC+ or ProASIC3 device. See [6] for details. 
After choosing the new FPGA device we had to verify its 
expected resistance with measurements. We found that 
neither a ProASIC+ evolution board nor a new SIU prototype 
board built with this device (see Figure 1) showed any 
configuration loss in proton and neutron irradiations. See 
Table 2 for the measurement results. 
Table 2: Measurement results on configuration loss  
in Actel ProASIC flash memory based FPGAs 
SEU cross sections /configuration cell 
σconfig cell   of 5-14 MeV neutrons no error 
σconfig cell   of 171-180 MeV protons no error 
60Co γ irradiation  (dose rate: 40 Gy/hour) no damage up to 100 Gy 
Calculated number of configuration errors 
# of config. loss in 10 years in 1 SIU card no error 
# of config. loss per hour in 400 SIUs 0 
 
III. DATA CORRUPTION MEASUREMENTS 
The other consequence of SEUs in the FPGAs is that 
upsets may change the status (content) of registers (logic 
cells) and/or the embedded user memory cells during 
operation. Although these events may not cause a functional 
interrupt of the device (it does not stop working), they result 
in bit errors in the data transmission. From the DAQ point of 
view a certain rate of data bit errors are acceptable if they are 
detected by the link protocol. From the beginning (i.e. the 
first prototype SIU) we measured not only the configuration 
loss of the FPGAs but the data corruption during operation as 
well. We developed several special test firmware to be able to 
measure data errors generated in the register cells (logic 
cells) and in the embedded user memories (e.g. FIFOs) 
separately. The method of these measurements is described in 
[5]. The results are summarized in Table 3.  
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It can be seen that the cross sections for errors generated 
by the irradiation are in the same magnitude for register cells 
and for memory cells. However, there are much more 
memory cells than register cells in the SIU design. It results 
that the vast majority of the single bit errors caused by the 
irradiation are generated in the memory cells, namely in the 
two FIFOs used in the design (one on the transmitter and on 
the receiver side). The goal was to achieve that these data 
errors are all detected. We had to re-design the SIU logic to 
fulfil this new requirement. This needed careful firmware 
development work but, fortunately, there was no need for 
change in the hardware. 
 
Table 3: Data corruption measurements of SIUs with different FPGAs 
ALTERA APEX-E  
(0.18 mm CMOS)  
SRAM-based 
ACTEL APA150  
(0.25 mm CMOS)  
Flash-based 
ACTEL A3P250  
(0.13 mm CMOS)  
Flash-based  
σregister cell  
[10-14 cm2 
/logic cell] 
σmemory cell  
[10-14 cm2/bit] 
σregister cell  
[10-14 cm2 
/logic cell] 
σmemory cell  
[10-14 cm2/bit] 
σregister cell  
[10-14 cm2 
/logic cell] 
σmemory cell  
[10-14 cm2/bit] 
5-14 MeV 
neutrons 0.166 - 0.706 0.29 – 0.51 No error 0.61 0.269 3.02 
171-180 MeV 
protons 4.90 – 8.20 3.08 – 4.24 0.607 5.43 0.267 11.5 
# of errors  
in 10 years  
in 1 SIU card 
20 – 50 (n) 
9 – 20 (p) 
44 – 55 (n) 
9 – 18 (p) 
No error (n) 







# of errors  
per hour in  
























if not detected 
 
 
IV. THE FINAL SIU DESIGN WITH PARITY CHECK 
There are several possible mitigation techniques, which 
can be used to avoid and/or detect the errors caused by 
SEUs. 
One of the widely adopted methods is the so-called 
triple module redundancy (TRM). This solution, however, 
requires many extra logic resources, and therefore a larger 
FPGA device. The increased number of device resources 
(logic and memory cells) would also increase the chance of 
being affected by the high-energy particles. 
In order to detect the bit errors that may occur in the 
FPGA’s memory cells, one can use error detection schemes 
based on cyclic redundancy codes (CRC) or parity bits. The 
CRC checksum is a powerful protection mechanism used in 
serial transmission protocols. However, the behaviour of 
the error caused by SEUs in the embedded memory cells 
(isolated single bit errors) does not justify the complexity 
required by the CRC calculation. Therefore, a simple yet 
efficient error detection based on parity check logic has 
been implemented in the FPGA device.  
The new and final functional block diagram of the SIU 












2x16-bit  data pat h
at 106.25 MHz 
( to 2125 Mbps serial)
32 bit s
32 bit s
32-bit  data pat h




























Figure 2:  Block diagram of the FPGA design on the final SIU 
V. FINAL MEASUREMENT RESULTS 
In order to test and verify this redesigned, radiation 
tolerant SIU we developed and carried out several series of 
radiation tolerance tests and measurements. With these tests 
we measured the bit error rates both in the registers and in 
the embedded memory cells, and tested their detection in 
radiation environment. Data corruption due to SEUs is 
detected by the parity check logic. If detected, the firmware 
attaches an error bit to the control information sent together 
with the data. During the measurements, the transmitted 
data was consisted of different known data patterns 
(alternating patterns, flying 0s or 1s, incremental data). We 
designed two different tests.  
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During the so called loop-back tests the SIU received 
data from the DDL link and the special firmware in its 
FPGA sent these data back trough the link. In this case the 
data went through the FPGA’s memory cells twice. In the 
other measurement method the SIU, loaded with the final 
firmware, was plugged into a radiation tolerant data 
generator, which produced data according to the DDL 
protocol. In this case the data flow is only uni-directional. 
In both cases the measurement software compared the 
received data against the expected one and checked 
whether the error bit had been set in case of erroneous data. 
If it was set we considered the error to be detected. We 
carried out the measurements up to the neutron fluence of 
1011 n/cm2, which corresponds to the radiation level 
expected during 2.5 years of SIU operation.  
During these measurements we found the SIU-imposed 
error bits attached to all erroneous events, that is, the data 
corruptions caused by the irradiation were fully detected by 
the parity check logic. The results of the measurements are 
summarized in Table 4.  
Table 4: Measurement results on neutron, proton and γ 
irradiation of the final SIU card 
 SIU card (v. 2.3) w/ ACTEL A3P250 FPGA  
σ data error for 5-14 MeV 
neutrons (0.4 - 1.0) * 10
-14 cm2/bit 
σ data error for 171-180 MeV 
protons (6 - 7.2) * 10
-14 cm2/bit 
Co60 gamma irradiation No effect up to 100 Gy (10 krad)
# of data errors in 10 years 
in 1 SIU 
26 - 70 (n) 
4 - 10 (p) 
# of data errors per hour  
in 400 SIUs 
0.4 - 1 (n) 
0.06 - 0.15 (p) 
Percentage of detected errors 
relative to all errors ~ 100 % 
VI. PROJECT STATUS 
The ALICE Detector Data Link has been developed in 
collaboration of CERN and KFKI Research Institute for 
Particle and Nuclear Physics, Budapest. One component of 
the project was to test and evaluate a radiation tolerant 
version of the SIU card. With the measurements described 
in this paper we completed the evaluation of the radiation 
tolerant Source Interface Unit. 
The detector data travelling through the DDL link is 
protected now in threefold way:  
- 8 bit / 10 bit data coding is part of the DDL low level 
protocol, 
- 16 bit CRC words accompany the data on its way 
between the Source and Destination Interface 
Units, 
- and now, parity bits protect the data in both directions 
(to and from the detector) inside the SIU subject to 
irradiation. 
The production of the DDL SIU cards has been started 
this year. More than the half of the 550 cards needed by the 
ALICE experiment has already been produced and their 
installation on the sub-detectors has been started. The 
production will be completed in the 4th quarter of 2006. 
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